Introduction
Sewage treatment in China is important because of its linkages with two important issues: water pollution and public health. Water pollution in China is extensive and serious. Scholars have documented that the water in 54% of China's rivers is not t for consumption. Water pollution-related damages to health alone cost China 9.47 billion yuan in 2003 (World Bank 2007). The ability to return treated water into the environment is important because China leans heavily on surface sources of water. Between 300 million and 500 million
Chinese lack access to piped water, and only 28% of rural households have access to improved sanitation (Vennemo et al 2009) .
Despite the importance of this issue, little is known about why progress in the construction of sewage treatment facilities has been so uneven.
Some cities
have constructed large amounts of sewage treatment capacity, while others have largely neglected to build additional needed facilities.
Intuition would suggest that factors like population, wealth, and preferences drive the provision of sewage treatment capacity. We nd that these explanations are correct and do seem to play an important role. The purpose of this paper is to argue that China's system of tax sharing is a potentially signicant factor in explaining the dierent levels of provision of environmental public infrastructure.
Under China's tax sharing system, some cities are allowed to keep high shares of their value-added tax (VAT), while others keep relatively small shares.
Since the VAT is levied on industrial activity, we hypothesize that cities that However, there are several endogeneity problems with using the most direct candidate: a city's share of VAT retained in 2001.
For example, provinces had the right to change or reassign city tax shares.
If a city had a budget surplus, its VAT share might be decreased. If a city had a change of leadership, its new leaders might plausibly negotiate a larger VAT share, or a smaller decrease in share than would otherwise be expected. While most cities had xed VAT shares, some had shares that moved up and down over time.
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As a result, we employ an instrumental variables strategy where we use the share of VAT retained in 1995 to proxy for a city's scal incentives. The use of this instrument restricts the number of endogenous pathways that can aect both VAT share and the construction of sewage treatment facilities to one: the method by which provinces initially assigned scal incentives.
The historical origins of China's current tax system suggest that this instrument is certainly relevant. China's 1994 tax reform installed an entirely new structure for the VAT, but did not address how revenues should be allocated to cities. The authority to allocate scal incentives was given to provinces, 2 and each province installed its own system of allocating pools of VAT revenue.
We nd that provincial tax sharing systems initially installed in 1994 persisted through the time period of our sewage data.
The instrument is validated by the historical accounts of the methods by which provincial authorities assigned scal incentives. We conrm these accounts empirically. We look at which provinces chose to pass through all revenues and which chose to withhold revenues. We study the empirical patterns by which provinces initially deployed scal incentives for cities within their domain, and nd that the most important explanation is equalization, where poorer cities received higher shares of VAT revenues. We control for the equalization rationale and the routes through which this is likely to aect sewage treatment through the use of covariates.
Our central result is that cities react to higher VAT sharing ratios by ex- Finally, we show that transfer payments, which should be independent of scal incentives, are uncorrelated with VAT sharing ratios.
This paper benets from ideas within the second generation scal federalism literature (Oates 2005) . Rather than presenting local ocials as benign decision makers focused entirely on social welfare, this strain of literature models them as revenue-maximizing opportunists who channel eort into functions that reap nancial reward. The possible ineciencies in decentralized government were derived analytically by Gordon (1983) , in an elegant optimal tax model of scal federalism.
Other papers have used dierent contexts to connect local scal incentives and spending on public goods. Zhuravskaya (2000) argued that local governments with low scal incentives have no incentives to increase the tax base or provide public goods. After showing that some cities in Russia must share almost all additional revenues they generate, she connected the absence of scal incentives among these cities with inecient public service provision, in the forms of higher infant mortality and decreased availability of regular schooling. 3 the behavior of political entities at the city level in China. We provide new illumination into China's system of city-level scal incentives, and tie these incentives to city-level outcomes.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the history of the 1994 tax reform in China and discusses the history and political economy of VAT sharing. The importance of sewage treatment is also discussed. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 explains the measure of scal incentives used, and describes the empirical methodology and identication strategy of the paper. Sewage treatment plant construction is funded in part out of a set of fees included in the price of water. The level of the water consumption fee varies with each city. One of the fees within the water consumption fee is split between the operation of wastewater treatment facilities and the construction of new wastewater treatment plants. This fee is collected by government billing agencies and distributed to wastewater treatment plant operators. We control for the possibility that dierent fee levels inuenced sewage plant construction by including per household consumption of water.
The price of water is considered a sensitive political subject in China. Cities cannot arbitrarily raise the price of water to fund the construction of new sewage treatment plants; price rises in cities are usually carefully coordinated with the central government and phased in over an extended period of time.
Local Government Implementation of Sewage Treatment
Local governments have widely adopted the strategy of building sewage treatment facilities to attract industry. One saying, qitong yiping, states that, in order to attract investment, local governments must build seven forms of infrastructure: electricity, roads, water, telecommunications, cable, leveled ground, and waste treatment.
Companies considering a choice of location know that, under the three synchronizations policy, they must provide a means of treating their wastewater was intended to reduce the distortionary elements of the existing tax structure.
Third, it was intended to move China away from a system where negotiation played an important role in central and local government relations, and toward a xed, stable, and transparent tax system.
To accomplish its rst goal, it sharply changed the tax administration system. Rather than relying on local tax authorities to collect taxes and share them with the central government, the 1994 reform gave responsibilities of collecting central taxes and shared taxes to the central government. From that point forward, the central government controlled revenues and shared them downward, rather than relying on upward sharing from local governments.
To accomplish its second goal, the tax reform replaced the prior turnover tax system, which consisted of as many as 37 overlapping and contradictory taxes, and applied dierent rates to dierent products (Ma 1997 ). The new system applied the value-added tax (VAT) to a much broader tax base, and set a uniform rate of 17%. It set a turnover tax on services of between 3% and 5%.
Finally, it set new corporate income tax rates and personal income tax rates while eliminating many forms of special treatment, like lower rates for foreign enterprises and individuals.
To accomplish its third goal, it codied a new system of tax sharing that 5 applied a uniform set of rules to local governments. In the previous system, provinces held one of six forms of revenue-sharing contracts (Agarwala 1992) , which resulted in sharply dierent marginal revenue retention rates. After the reform, each tax was designated as a central tax, a shared tax, or a local tax, depending on who would receive revenues from that tax. Shared taxes had xed, statutory sharing rules set between the central government and provincial governments. The VAT, designated a shared tax, was split with 75% of VAT revenues accruing to the central government and 25% to the province in which revenues were generated.
The VAT Share as a Measure of Fiscal Incentives
The VAT is the tax at the center of our analysis. The VAT is the most important tax in China in terms of revenue collected, accounting for over 40% of all central government tax revenues. This paper focuses on how scal incentives led cities to attract industry through building sewage treatment plants.
Among the streams of revenues received by cities, there are other options that might be potential candidates for our study. For example, cities receive annual rebates from higher levels of government. The amount of these rebates is determined through a formula that grows a base amount according to the combined growth rates of the VAT and the consumption tax (Shah and Shen 2006) . The consumption tax in China is a turnover tax, paid by consumers, and is focused on particular types of goods such as tobacco, alcohol, and reworks. In the formula determining these rebates, the year-over-year growth rates of VAT and of the consumption tax are mixed, making it dicult to extract meaningful information about city incentives.
Another possible candidate might be the corporate income tax, which is also shared between the levels of Chinese government hierarchy. However, the corporate income tax is levied on all corporations, including rms in the services and agricultural industries that would not be attracted to sewage treatment infrastructure. Hence, this paper focuses on the VAT, the only tax focused on rms in the industrial sector, 4 as the most appropriate subject for our study.
The VAT is also attractive because the data give clean measures that allow direct observation of VAT sharing rates.
VAT Sharing between Provinces and Cities
The 1994 4 The business tax is a turnover tax, levied only on services rms.
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Although the central government took the same, xed 75% share out of each province's VAT collections, provinces were able to determine themselves how to apportion the remaining 25%. As a result, a variety of systems proliferated.
An example will facilitate understanding of these systems. Suppose a rm within the city of Zunyi, in the province of Guizhou, pays 100 renmenbi ( Nine of the 31 provinces examined here passed less than 100% of VAT revenues, and did so in a manner that assigned dierent VAT sharing rates to dierent cities. Among these provinces, the VAT share retained by cities often uctuated between 1995 and 2001. However, the VAT rate was restricted to the domain of possibilities allowed by the province. These data suggest that provinces changed some city rates in the middle of this time period. Data in these provinces are marked by a period of steady VAT shares, a sudden decline or rise, followed nally by another steady period of VAT shares.
However, for many cities, the VAT shares they received between 1995 and 5 For much of our analysis, we use the 1995 VAT sharing rate, although the tax reform in China was initiated in 1994. Wong (1997) writes that the 1994 tax reform was implemented only a few months after it was approved. She documents that neither taxpayers nor local tax ocials were prepared for the transition. Moreover, through 1994, cities and counties were in doubt as to whether the rules of the contract system (the pre-1994 system) would govern the new tax sharing system.
We conclude from this reading that 1994 VAT sharing rates may be unreliable, since they involved a period of transition and, at best, reect a system in place for only part of the year. Why did dierent provinces decide on dierent patterns of VAT sharing?
Bahl (1999), p. 150, writes:
With so much discretion, it is not surprising that provincial governments have developed many dierent systems of revenue sharing.
Some provinces seem to stress equalization, others seem to promote regions with greater economic development potential, others seem to emphasize incentives for resource mobilization, and in a few instances, the division of revenues seems almost random. Hence, the results of this study apply only to major cities, all those for which sewage data are reported. 
Empirical Specication
In appendix A, we lay out a brief model of the choice of public spending under a system of revenue sharing. The intuition behind this model is that cities with higher shares of revenue retained have higher marginal benet from directing funds toward activities generating more taxes. As a result, they expand infrastructure more relative to cities with low scal incentives.
Our base empirical specication for this model is:
Here, the term y i,2008 − y i,2002 is the growth in sewage treatment capacity over our sample period for city i. For this empirical context, we think that using a cross-section specication involving the growth in sewage treatment capacity is appropriate. In particular, we considered using a panel dataset with city-level xed eects. We found this to be inappropriate for several reasons. First, investment in sewage treatment is lumpy. In some cities, constructing even one plant can double or triple a city's treatment capacity. Cities could construct a plant by nancing it, which would appear in the data as a burst of growth poorly tied to some change in scal sharing rate. Hence, measuring the change in facilities over a period of time is appropriate. In addition, for 60% of cities, their scal incentives are virtually constant over the entire period we can observe. Using a panel dataset rather than a cross-section would eliminate the use of these cities.
We also considered using total sewage treatment capacity, y i,2008 , as the dependent variable. We rejected this specication because sewage treatment facilities are long-lived; sewage plants may have been built for other reasons 9 outside the years that our data cover. We have data that provides details of some sewage plants. Some of these plants were built before the 1994 scal reform, implying that they could not be aected by city scal incentives.
The employment of this empirical specication leaves our analysis open to the possibility that unobserved, city-level variation could aect both scal incentives and sewage treatment plant construction. We employ our understanding of the history behind the deployment of scal incentives along with our instrumental variables specication to limit the possible pathways of this endogeneity to those that are related to the initial assignment of scal incentives in 1994.
Our hypothesis is that scal incentives are positively related to measures of public spending that expand the city tax base, including sewage treatment infrastructure: β 1 is positive and signicant. In addition, scal incentives are unrelated to forms of public spending that do not expand public infrastructure, such as transfers. F I i is city i's share of VAT retained. The Sub-provincial Public Finance
Statistics reports the amount of VAT retained by the city (gongshang shuishou zengzhishui ) and the gure representing 75% of all VAT collected, which is turned over to the central government (yiban yusuanshouru zongji zengzhishui 75%). We can therefore compute the city share of local VAT taxes as:
Cities that retain 25% of VAT generated, the entire local share, will have F I i = 1; cities that retain none of their VAT will have F I i = 0. In our instrumental variables approach, we use a city's VAT share in 1995. We also tested VAT shares in 1996 and 1997 to conrm that our nding remains consistent.
Identication Strategy
Our identication strategy relies on the history and political economy of China's system of prefecture-level scal incentives. Between the time a city's VAT share was established, after the 1994 reform, and the time that the city was making visible decisions to build sewage treatment plants, in 2002, many endogenous circumstances could have caused provinces to adjust a city's VAT share.
We use a city's 1995 VAT share as an instrument for its 2001 VAT share. This restricts the endogeneity in determination of VAT share only to the set of reasons by which provinces decided to initially allocate VAT shares in 1994. Provinces adopted a variety of systems, with some provinces designating a complete passthrough, while other provinces decided to keep much of the revenues generated. In addition, we utilize China's unique pattern of development, which emphasized the development of some areas, such as coastal cities, over inland cities.
These types of cities, which are more similar, are likely be beneted or harmed in the same way by equalization or mobilization. We examine whether the impacts of scal incentives can be seen within these subgroups of cities.
Negotiation and Favoritism
One possible consideration is whether cities were able to negotiate their scal shares. If a city had an unobservable characteristic, such as a more competent city manager, it might be able to negotiate a higher scal share. Simultaneously, this competence would allow it to build greater amounts of sewage treatment capacity. Closely related to this is the concern that some cities are favored by being targeted for development over others. They would then receive both higher scal shares and greater development of sewage treatment capacity in the form of infrastructure earmarks.
We address this concern through our study of which cities tend to get higher levels of VAT shares. What patterns of negotiation or favoritism can be observed from the data? Do VAT shares look as if they were negotiated or more as if they were assigned?
Other Forms of Fiscal Incentives
The VAT share is just one part of a broader revenue-sharing arrangement between provinces and cities. If other parts of these contracts, such as corporate income tax sharing, or transfers, are correlated, these could also drive city incentives to build infrastructure.
To address this concern, we argue that other parts of revenue-sharing agreements between provinces and cities are less likely to serve as incentives to build sewage treatment capacity. Other taxes, such as the corporate income tax or the business sales tax, include in large part nonindustrial sectors that are unlikely to be interested in sewage treatment capacity. Transfers between provinces and cities are tied to the growth rates of both the VAT and the consumption tax, making the marginal incentive to grow the industrial base unclear.
Province-Level Variation in Needs
Since the VAT share is driven strongly by province-level choices, do more needier provinces keep higher shares of VAT revenues for themselves? These poorer and more needy provinces would then be unable or unwilling to supply sewage treatment infrastructure.
To address this concern, we looked closely at which provinces allowed their cities high levels of scal incentives, and which provinces kept high shares for themselves. We examined the possibility that the motive driving provinces to assign low VAT shares was based on their own needs.
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Evidence and Results
Description of Fiscal Incentives
Our measure of scal incentives is the share of local VAT revenues retained by the city. We use equation 2 to calculate the sharing rate for each city in each year. Figure 4 shows the raw data, limiting the sample of cities to the 111 for which sewage treatment outcomes are available.
Signicant variation among cities exists. Most cities retain between 50%
and 100% of local VAT revenues, with a concentration of cities at 100%. A very small number of cities have VAT sharing ratios in individual years above 1. We do not understand why cities would be able to retain more than the local share of VAT. It is possible that temporary special deals were negotiated with the government; alternatively, data entry errors are known to be present in China's ocial yearbooks. Since over 99% of these data show a sharing ratio at or below 1, the VAT shares data appear to reect our expectations well. 6 This graph suggests that province-level variation is not a particular driver of our results. We would be concerned if any one province had both particularly low scal incentives and low growth in sewage treatment capacity, indicating that it was an outlier. However, a variety of provinces have cities that are low in scal incentives and low in sewage treatment capacity construction.
6 There are four Directly Controlled Municipalities (DCM): Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing, and Tianjin. These cities have been given province-level tax and political authority. DCM do not have scal incentive ratios at 1 as would be expected since they do not belong to a province.
We believe that DCM use a dierent method to report budgetary statistics to the Sub- 
The Assignment of Fiscal Incentives
We are most concerned about the methods by which provinces assigned scal incentives to cities as a result of the 1994 tax reform. Our strategy is to identify these methods and then to account for them in our instrumental variables regressions. The possible methods can be classied into two broad areas. The rst is whether the provinces that assigned complete pass-through diered systematically from those that required sharing from their cities. The second is whether the assignment of scal incentives within provinces was endogenous in some way to sewage treatment infrastructure.
We tested for endogeneity using the Durban-Wu-Hausman test. Neither VAT sharing ratios in 1995 nor those in 2001 show endogeneity under this test.
We studied the methods by which provinces chose their method of assignment. However, these means mask the high level of variation within each category.
For each set of provinces, there are some provinces that are relatively rich and populous, and some that are poorer and smaller. This helps alleviate the fourth of our threats to identication: that poorer provinces kept higher shares of VAT for themselves and also did not fund sewage treatment instructure.
With the possible exception of the VAT dependence variable, the two groups cannot be distinguished with any signicant level of statistical condence, as reected by the P-values in the right-hand column of this In provinces that were more dependent on industrial productivity for their taxes, lower shares of VAT revenue were assigned to cities in their domain.
A second area of concern is the methods by which each province assigns scal incentives to its cities. We studied within-province variation in the assignment of VAT shares to cities by using a city-level regression that includes provincelevel xed eects. These regressions are presented in table 5. These regressions support the hypothesis that equalization, rather than economic mobilization, seemed to play a role in within-province assignment of VAT shares; poorer cities receive higher shares of VAT.
These ndings are contrary to the second of our threats to identication:
that negotiation and favoritism played a signicant role. For the large number of cities located in provinces that assigned constant scal incentives to all cities in their domain, negotiation and favoritism cannot possibly have played a role.
For the cities that oered heterogenous scal incentives, cities that were poorer tended to receive higher scal incentives, rather than cities that were richer.
This nding suggests that VAT shares were assigned as part of a provincial plan to provide more nancial resources to less-well-o cities, and not given as a result of well-o cities being able to negotiate good deals for themselves. sewage treatment facilities, and may have had their tax sharing rates adjusted downward in years following the tax reform.
The ideal natural experiment would be to have two identical bins of cities separated only by their exogenously imparted scal incentives. By placing cities within subgroups and then controlling for important dierentiating factors like population and wealth, we attempt to econometrically construct these bins.
Cities within the same bin are likely to experience similar degrees of favoritism, isolating the impact of scal incentives.
We tested equation 1 on subgroups of cities. We tested three subgroups:
provincial capitals (25 cities), coastal cities (17 cities), and subprovincial cities (15 cities). While these samples are too small to obtain reliable estimates, we found that a positive and quantitatively signicant relationship exists for each of these smaller groupings. The magnitude of the coecient is actually bigger for each of these subgroups than for our main result reported in table 8, suggesting that, as the group of cities being compared becomes more similar, the impact of scal incentives is more important.
This robustness check rejects the notion that factors such as favoritism or negotiation, potentially associated with the provincial assignment of scal incentives in 1994, played a signicant role in the construction of sewage treatment facilities. Since scal incentives played a signicant role even with groups of cities that occupied similar spots within the Chinese administrative hierarchy, we believe they responded to their scal incentives in their sewage treatment construction decisions.
Other Signicant Covariates
All control variables in table 6 are the level of that variable in 2001. As expected, cities that were larger in population and richer also grew their sewage treatment capacity more. These cities may have higher needs for wastewater treatment and greater ability to build infrastructure.
Also, the initial level of sewage treatment capacity provided in 2002 appeared to be negatively related to growth over the time period examined. As noted before, sewage treatment investment is lumpy, with some cities constructing only one or two plants. Having high capacity at the beginning of the sample may indicate some slack in capacity, with relatively less need required in the future.
Results on the Relationship between Fiscal Incentives and Transfers
Our regressions using transfer payments of cities act as a placebo test, ensuring that our methods do not produce a false positive result against forms of spending that should be unrelated to scal incentives. Since spending on transfers is generally a function of underlying demographic characteristics, cities can exercise only limited discretionary control. Moreover, increases in spending on transfers do not build the tax base. We expected a null result.
Our testing, displayed in table 9, shows a moderately positive relationship between scal incentives and spending on education and science. It nds statistically insignicant relationships for spending on pensions. It nds a statistically negative relationship between spending on social security and scal incentives.
Most tests actually have a moderately negative result for these coecients.
These results suggest that the relationships between spending and scal incentives that we have found are not purely income eects caused by increased levels of spending. Cities appear to substitute among dierent types of spending as their incentives go up. They increase types of spending that may be attractive to expanding their tax base, like infrastructure and education, and decrease types of spending that have no impact on tax base, like transfers.
Conclusion
China's need for a systematic water treatment plan is enormous and growing.
China has over 300 cities with more than 1 million people; its industry shows Consider a city manager deciding where to spend public funds. Spending on public infrastructure, S, expands the tax revenues of the city according to the function g (S), with the city retaining only a share α of these revenues. It also increases city welfare by aS, where a is an exogenous constant. The cost of purchasing and operating the public infrastructure is a convex function I (S).
Cities can also choose to spend public funds through other means, such as transfers. Transferring an amount E provides non-nancial benets to the city E.
The city manager's problem is then to maximize aS + E subject to the constraint I (S) + E ≤ αg (S).
Labeling the optimal choice of spending on public infrastructure S * , we prove that dS * dα > 0 using the following assumptions:
Proofs: The rst-order condition with respect to S yields:
a + αg (S) = I (S)
Dierentiating this equation with respect to α, we nd g (S) + αg " (S)
Under assumptions 1 and 2 above, dS dα > 0. The city manager receives a positive net benet from spending on E. Any funds that are not spent on S are spent on E. However, the change in the amount of funds spent on E as a result of changes in scal incentives α is ambiguous. On one hand, a higher sharing increases the nancial resources of the city αg (S). On the other hand, higher sharing rates also increase subsitution toward S away from E. • Some cities shrank sewage treatment capacity or did not change over the We adjusted the scal incentive value to 1 when equation 2 resulted in a ratio higher than 1. 
